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5 The Transition Is Not Over,
but Note the Merits
of the Central European Model
Jan Svejnar
William Davidson Institute and University ofMichigan
I define economic transition as a process that is completed when
two conditions hold:
a) central planning is abolished and no longer serves as the alloca-
tional and distributional mechanism in the economy, and
b) central planning and direct government intervention is replaced
by an efficiently functioning market system. The term "effi-
ciently functioning market system" is, of course, key and needs
further definition. I take it to mean that the transition economies
generate relatively rapid and sustainable rates of economic
growth and become compatible with advanced market econo-
mies in the sense that neither side requires major protection
through subsidies or barriers against trade, capital flows, and
labor mobility.
The first condition has been met in a number of economies, includ-
ing those that are doing relatively well (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Slo-
venia), as well as those whose economic performance has been poor
(e.g., Russia and Ukraine). It must also be noted that countries such as
Slovenia and Croatia have been displaying many of the transition fea-
tures, but their starting point was a labor-managed system with social
ownership and substantial government intervention. The first condi-
tion may hence be regarded as being a necessary one for the transition
to proceed but not a sufficient one for the transition to be completed.
The second condition defines the end of the transition process as
being the state of an advanced market economy. No transition econ-
omy has so far satisfied this condition, and the study of how emerging
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market economies become mature market economies is in fact the
study of the fulfillment of this second condition.
Given my definition, it is not surprising that I have questioned dec-
larations such as that of the Czech prime minister in 1995, when he
stated that the transition was accomplished, with the remaining tasks
being secondary and akin to fine-tuning in the Western economies.
Indeed, 1995 was a year for euphoria. As may be seen from
Table 1 (on p. 93), the Czech Republic and the other Central Euro-
pean economies 1 emerged from one of the most severe depressions
experienced any where in Europe in the twentieth century. With the
exception of Hungary, economic growth was rapid across the region,
and in most countries the rate of growth was accelerating. Inflation,
which at the start of the 1990s reached the hyper zone in a number of
Central European economies, was curtailed (Table 2). In some coun-
tries (e.g., the Czech and Slovak republics and Slovenia), the rate of
inflation dipped into single digits, and in all countries in Central
Europe it was below 40 percent. Unemployment, which appeared in
most Central European countries in 1990 and reached a double-digit
rate in all except the Czech Republic by 1992, started to show a
declining tendency in 1995 (Table 3). Slovenia as well as the Czech
and Slovak republics were running balanced budgets, while the other
economies were making serious strides toward reducing their budget
deficits (Table 4). Foreign direct investment, while modest compared
to earlier expectations, was showing signs of acceleration (Table 5).
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia obtained sovereign debt
ratings by Standard & Poor's, and the other countries were on their
way to being rated (Table 6).
The "Central European model" of transition from Soviet-style cen-
tral planning seemed to be working and doing much better than the
"Russian and Newly Independent States (NIS) model" in the former
Soviet Union. Taking Russia and Ukraine as examples of the latter
model, we see that these countries experienced a much longer period of
deep economic decline (Table 1) and only recently started to recover. 2
Russia and Ukraine also suffered from a longer spell of high inflation
(Table 2) and recorded lower unemployment rates (especially
Ukraine), as restructuring of firms proceeded at a slower pace, and
lowering (late payment) of wages and relying on shorter hours were
preferred to layoffs as a form of labor force adjustment (Table 3). As
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may be seen from Table 4, the prolonged inflationary period had an
underpinning in significant budget deficits in the first half of the 1990s.
Both Russia and Ukraine attracted only modest amounts of foreign
direct investment (Table 5), and it was not until 1996 that Russia (but
not Ukraine) obtained a rating (BB-) from Standard & Poor's (Table 6).
China and Vietnam represent the third model of transition. This
"Asian model" has appeared very attractive from a number of stand-
points. It has been characterized by very rapid.economic growth, which
in the 1990s exceeded 10 percent in China and hovered around 9 per-
cent in Vietnam (Table 1). Moreover, China's period of rapid economic
growth has lasted two full decades. Inflation has fluctuated widely in
both countries, but for most of the 1990s the rate of inflation was well
below 20 percent (Table 2). Unemployment is hard to measure in these
highly agrarian economies, but until recently urban unemployment
(based on official registry data) was relatively limited (Table 3).3 China
has also kept its budget deficit under control, and Vietnam has gradually
brought its sizable deficit down (Table 4). Finally, China has been rel-
atively successful in attracting foreign direct investment (Table 5), and
it secured sovereign debt rating as early as 1993 (Table 6).
Using a number of performance indicators, such as the ones in
Tables 1-5, the Asian model appears to have produced the best results,
followed by the Central European model. The Russian-NIS model has
usually been seen as the least successful. The picture changed a bit in
1996-1997, as the economic performance of some Central European
countries deteriorated. Thus, the Czech Republic saw a slowdown in
economic growth, and in the Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania experi-
enced a deceleration that turned into decline (Table 1y. In the Czech
Republic, the early diagnosis suggests that the country did not succeed
in adequately restructuring its firms and in establishing a well-func-
tioning legal and regulatory system. Bulgaria and Romania have suf-
fered from the same problem, coupled with a loss of macroeconomic
control (Tables 2 and 4). At the same time, in 1997, there were signs
that Russia experienced its first period of economic growth and that the
rate of economic decline was decelerating in Ukraine. Overall, while
the rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) slowed in Central
and Eastern Europe (including the Balkans and the Baltic states) from
over 5 percent in 1995 to about 3 percent in 1997, the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) turned a 1 percent decline into a 1 percent
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rate of growth during the same period. The 1998 crisis showed that the
Russian and CIS model was fragile.
I will review the principal aspects of the transformation in Central
Europe and contrast these features with those of the transition econo-
mies in the other models. Then I will discuss the challenges faced by
Central Europe if it is to complete its economic transition.
THE PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF
CENTRAL EUROPEAN TRANSITION
Some outcomes have been relatively systematic, while others have
varied across the Central European countries. The systematic develop-
ments-those that are similar across countries-are the transformation
of these economies from centrally planned or government-guided,
labor-managed economies to essentially market economies; relatively
successful macroeconomic stabilization (exemplified by the countries I
ability to contain initial inflationary pressures); opening up to world
trade and reorienting trade from East to West; the rapid creation of a
large number of small- and medium-sized enterprises; significant
reduction in state subsidies to firms together with the creation of a sub-
stantial social safety net; and the development of laws, institutions, and
practices conducive to the functioning of labor, capital, and goods mar-
kets.
Outcomes that have varied across these countries include the
extent of privatization and restructuring of state enterprises; the rates of
unemployment and duration of unemployment spells; the ability to
contain budget deficits and foreign indebtedness; and the perceived
effectiveness of reforms as measured by the rate of domestic invest-
ment, inflow of foreign direct investment, foreign trade performance,
and rate of economic growth.
The Systematic Developments
The most notable outcome of the first eight years of the transition
in Central Europe is that these economies have undergone a virtually
complete transformation from disintegrating central planning (or cen-
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tralized labor-management) into an imperfect but vibrant market sys-
tem. Broadly speaking, these economies now operate on market
principles. Most prices are free and reflect relative scarcities of
resources. The economies are open to international trade and are com-
posed of a dynamic and rapidly growing sector of new private firms,
together with a heterogeneous but generally shrinking sector of the old
(in most countries, former) state enterprises. In this respect, the Cen-
tral European economies resemble China, where the township and vil-
lage enterprises (TVEs), operating under relatively hard budget
constraints and market principles, have also provided a major impetus
for economic development. The picture has been quite different in
Russia and in many of the newly independent states, where market
forces are still weak and the impact of new firms is limited.
Eager to dismantle the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) trading system that existed within the Soviet bloc and faced
with a collapsing Soviet market, the Central European economies have
dramatically reoriented their trade (see, for example, Brabant 1993).
While all of them traded for decades primarily within the CMEA, by
1993-1994 the European Community replaced the ex-CMEA region as
their principal trading partner. This achievement is notable for two rea-
sons: 1) few observers had expected these countries to be able to pene-
trate substantially the advanced Western markets, and virtually no one
had expected them to do so in such a short time interval, and 2) the
reorientation was carried out to a large extent by state enterprises
before any privatization took place. Major currency devaluations,
reductions of subsidies to firms, and the opening of trade have been the
factors driving the transformation in this area. In their ability to export
manufactured goods, the Central European countries again more
resemble China than the CIS countries, which, except for export of raw
materials, have remained relatively self-contained. In contrast to
China, the Central European countries have also opened up much more
to imports and capital flows.
While undertaking bold transformation measures, the Central
European countries have been quick to provide a relatively complete
and generous social safety net. Unemployment benefits were origi-
nally set at high levels and remain adequate even after rounds of reduc-
tions in the midst of reforms. A broadly defined system, providing
welfare, pension, and health care benefits, was also put in place. The
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system has so far enabled policymakers in Central Europe to prevent
the emergence of major income inequality and poverty, unlike the situ-
ation in Russia (see Garner and Terrell 1998). In China, most of the
economy has not been covered by a central social safety net. The net
exists in the case of state-owned firms, but the government is currently
moving to reduce its fiscal obligations toward workers in these enter-
prises.
Diverse Outcomes
Privatization of state enterprises has proceeded very unevenly
across the Central European economies. In the Czech and Slovak
republics, for example, most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been
mass-privatized, but restructuring and productivity growth have been
slow. In contrast, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia initially placed less
emphasis on privatizing the state-owned firms, but unit labor cost,
expressed in German marks, has been rising more slowly in these
economies than in the Czech and Slovak republics. In fact, in the first
half of the 1990s, the emphasis in Poland and Slovenia shifted from
privatization to commercialization of state or socially owned enter-
prises. Only in the last two years has there been a significant move in
these economies to privatize state or socially owned firms. Hungary
has pursued a persistent policy of individual sales of firms and has suc-
ceeded in selling a significant share of the economy over the last eight
years. In this aspect of the transition process, Russia resembles more
the Czech and Slovak republics in that it mass-privatized. The process
and the recipients of property have differed, but in both cases the
resulting corporate governance has been taking time to be organized.
China and Vietnam more resemble Poland and Slovenia, in that until
recently they focused less on privatization of SOEs and more on other
aspects of the transition.
Firms in all of the Central European countries decreased employ-
ment as they experienced falling demand for their output in the early
1990s. The amount of labor force adjustment differed, however, across
the individual countries. Firms in Hungary, for example, adjusted
employment more than those in the Czech Republic. Using large
enterprise-level data sets with annual observations from the pretransi-
tion and transition period, Basu, Estrin, and Svejnar (1995a, 1995b) in
----
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fact show that. the extent of pretransition "marketization" of the econ-
omy is correlated with the extent of employment adjustment in the
early phase of the transition. In particular, in 1989 and 1990, Czech
and Slovak firms behaved in accordance with a stereotype of a labor-
hoarding firm in a planned economy-not being forced to adjust
employment in response to changes in output and wages. The Polish
firms conformed to the stereotype of operating·in a semimarket econ-
omy by showing moderate sensitivity of employment to output and
wages. Estimates for later years indicate that all three economies con-
verged to higher elasticities, thus displaying behavior similar to that
observed in Western market economies. In contrast, data from Russian
industrial firms fail to show any significant elasticity of labor demand
to wages as late as 1993-1994.
The levels of investment declined in Central Europe during the first
phase of the transition in the early 1990s, but by the mid 1990s they
began to improve. In fact, it appears that by the mid 19908, gross
investment returned to relatively high levels (around 30 percent of
GDP) in the Czech and Slovak republics and to respectable levels (over
20' percent of GDP) in Poland and Hungary. The Czech and Slovak
levels are comparable to those in China and Vietnam, while the levels
in Poland and Hungary resemble those observed in Western Europe. In
contrast, according to data from the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), investment continued to decline at a rapid
pace in Russia through the mid 1990s.
At about 70 percent and 40 percent, respectively, Hungary and
Poland registered the highest foreign debt/GNP ratios in the region in
the early to mid 1990s. In contrast, Slovenia's ratio was about 5 per-
cent, and the Czech Republic's was below 25 percent. The different
burdens of indebtedness influenced the approach that the individual
countries adopted toward carrying out the transformation to a market
economy. Hungary, having been saddled with the highest foreign debt,
has, for instance, decided to privatize by selling firms individually to
foreign and domestic bidders, while the Czech Republic gave out sub-
stantial stakes in firms to citizens at large through the voucher privati-
zation method.
Although the Central European countries all succeeded in reorient-
ing trade from Eastern to Western partners, their exchange rate policies
and the resulting foreign trade performances have been diverse. For
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example, while Poland and Hungary repeatedly devalued their curren-
cies and eventually adopted a crawling peg system as their exchange
rate policy, the Czechs and Slovaks followed the approach of a fixed
exchange rate until 1997 and 1998, respectively. This policy resulted
in an overvaluation of the Czech and Slovak currencies relative to
those of Poland and Hungary. Consequently, while Poland and to a
lesser extent Hungary registered solid growth of exports in the mid
1990s, the Czech and Slovak republics have been experiencing slower
export growth and increasingly severe balance-of-trade and payments
deficits. The Czechs were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate in
1997, and the Slovaks in 1998. The policy of overvalued exchange
rates, in my view, explains a significant part (though not all) of the
poorer economic performance of the Czech Republic relative to that of
other Central European countries in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
The developments to date point to a number of challenges that the
Central European economies must meet if they are to improve their
efficiency, raise their living standards, and thus complete their transi-
tion to well-functioning and relatively advanced market economies.
The foremost challenge is how to generate high and sustained rates of
economic growth. This challenge has several underpinnings. The
principal aspect is the political one, namely, that economic growth with
widely reaching benefits is a prerequisite for maintaining momentum
in the transition. Since the early post-revolutionary euphoria has by
now evaporated, it is increasingly difficult for politicians to secure con-
sensus for major restructuring (be it at the level of firms, banks, or the
pension and health system). Of course, there is a chicken-and-egg
problem here: cooperation of the people is needed for restructuring and
growth, but the benefits of growth are needed for inducing cooperation.
In view of the slowdown in economic growth in the region over the last
three years, the question is whether the Central European countries will
be able to maintain the momentum to complete the transition.
Put in more quantitative terms, the fundamental question is
whether the Central European economies can generate long-term
--
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growth of GDP of 7 percent or more. With GDP per capita in Central
Europe at 25-40 percent of the Western European average, high growth
rates will have to be achieved and sustained if these countries are to
start closing the relative productivity and income gap with Western
Europe and the OECD countries in general. This challenge is truly for-
midable. The following tasks, in my view, constitute the building
blocks for meeting this challenge.
A high rate of efficiently placed investment is a prerequisite" for
economic growth in the region. In view of past developments, this
requirement is still a major hurdle for the Central European economies.
As the transformation to a market economy unfolded, it was expected
that market forces would induce a dramatic improvement in the effi-
ciency of investment and that the key problem would be the availability
of capital embodying modern technology. It turns out that, while the
availability of capital clearly became a major concern for many firms,
poor credit allocation by many banks has meant that the efficiency of
capital allocation did not increase as much as was anticipated.
The transition was hence expected to result in a partial reversal of
the previous situation, in which the rates of investment were high but
the efficiency of capital allocation was poor.4 The decade of the 1980s
was marked by a fall in the rate of investment in many Central and
Eastern European economies, together with the acceleration of techni-
cal progress in the West and the Western embargo on exports of high
technology to the Soviet bloc. These factors brought about the worsen-
ing of the relative technological position of the Central and Eastern
European economies. With the notable exception of Slovenia, these
countries entered the transition facing an acute need to spur investment
. embodying modern technology. So far they have succeeded only in
part, primarily in instances where there have been major Western
investments.
A key problem in this context has been the limited inflow of for-
eign direct investment in all Central European countries except Hun-
gary.. While the situation appears to be changing, the inflow over the
first eight years of the transition has been small in comparison to the
annual inflows of foreign direct investment in the (until recently) rap-
idly growing East Asian economies. One problem is that, in an attempt
to reduce budgetary defici~s and to establish adequate social safety
nets, most transitional economies have imposed high corporate taxes,
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which put a brake on foreign, as well as domestic, investment. Another
problem is that Western investors have been wary of many Central and
Eastern European economies. Perceived uncertainty has been high,
deriving in part from unclear property rights and nontransparent regu-
lation of the financial sector in some economies. The clear lesson is
that attracting foreign direct investment is a long and arduous process.
On the domestic front, the capital market has been developing only
slowly as an effective source of investment funds. The banking sector
is still highly concentrated, often significantly state-owned and ineffi-
cient' and facing limited foreign competition. Interest rates on loans
have been high as banks have been allowed to keep a sizable spread
between deposit and lending rates in order to create reserves. More-
over, central banks have often pursued high-interest-rate policies in
order to prevent capital flight. The problem has been especially acute
for export-oriented firms in countries maintaining overvalued exchange
rates. These firms have faced moderate Western inflation in the prod-
uct market and relatively high domestic interest rate costs.
High interest rates have also slowed the development of small- and
medium-sized firms. Moreover, after an initial period of easy lending
to small private-sector firms, banks have in recent years restricted lend-
ing to and set high collateral requirements for small businesses. Given
the key role that this sector has played in the transformation so far, it is
clear that future overall business performance will be jeopardized if
this part of the economy becomes significantly handicapped.
The situation of loan shortages is partly brought about by asym-
metric information between the banks and entrepreneurs. The banks
often report that they have funds but cannot find good projects, while
entrepreneurs claim that they are not able to get financing for projects
with high expected returns. The problem is related to the fact that
commercial banks in Central Europe have not had an adequate number
of well-trained and experienced loan officers and that they have gener-
ally suffered from inefficient operations. These shortcomings result in
a limited ability of the banks to appraise and monitor projects. Still,
lending funds to enterprises whose liquidation value may be very low
requires that the banks be able to track and control the operation. If
this condition cannot be fulfilled because the banks cannot obtain reli-
able information, the banks will prefer not to lend or will !equire very
high collateral. Another frequently cited reason for a lack of lending to
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small- and medium-sized firms is the established relationship between
banks and large firms and corruption. This is hard to substantiate, but
the fact that the quality of loan portfolios of a number of banks in the
region has severely deteriorated after they were restructured in the
early 1990s means that there has been a problem with the efficiency of
the banking sector during the transition.
The allocative role of the stock markets has so far been minimal.
Stock markets have been successfully established in most Central
European countries, but their trading volumes have been low. More-
over, in some countries, transactions often take place outside the stock
markets, thus further reducing their effectiveness.
With external funds being limited, firms have naturally turned to
internal financing. Yet, with profits often falling, many enterprises
have been unable to raise much investment capital internally in the first
few years of the transition. The well-performing ones have increas-
ingly done so, and the imposition of hard budget constraints, price lib-
eralization, and opening up to the world have improved allocation of
resources. There are also signs that Western banks have been increas-
ing direct lending to successful businesses in the region.
The second building block for meeting the fundamental challenge
of growth is human capital development. One feature that distin-
guishes the Central European economies from those of many develop-
ing countries is the relatively high level of general, as well as specific,
education (Boeri and Keese 1992). Since these countries are also rela-
tively poor in natural resources, investment in human capital is strategi-
cally important for their economic progress. Nevertheless, investment
in education as well as in research and development (R&D) has been
given relatively low priority during the transition. As a result, there has
been limited R&D and a significant brain drain in these nations.
The third building block consists of smoothly functioning labor
markets and social safety nets. With the notable exception of the
Czech Republic, a major challenge for the Central European countries
in the 1990s has been unemployment. The problem has been
addressed by putting into place adequate social safety nets and by pur-
suing active labor market policies, such as training of the unemployed.
Unfortunately, active micropoliciesalone, are unlikely to dramatically
improve labor market efficiency and to substantially reduce unemploy-
ment. For example, investing in greater labor mobility across districts
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would have little effect on unemployment, because the number of job-
less within each district greatly exceeds the number of vacancies, both
in general and within each educational category (Munich, Svejnar, and
Terrell 1995). Macroeconomic policies and, more generally, those that
stimulate economic growth are the more promising solution to the
unemployment problem.
The task of reducing unemployment has been complicated by the
fact that the provision of social safety nets has been taxing, especially
in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland, where foreign indebted-
ness and budget deficits have been major problems. Containing public
expenditures will clearly be important but difficult in the face of high
unemployment and dissatisfaction with the social cost of transition.
A particularly challenging task in this context is the reduction in
the cost of retirement benefits. In this respect, the Central European
countries are significantly worse off than either Russia or China, where
the burden of retirement benefits is less pronounced. The Central
European countries entered the transition period with publicly funded
pension systems, almost universal coverage of the population, low
retirement ages (on average 60 for men and 55 for women), high and
growing dependency ratios, large expenditure and contribution levels,
high statutory replacement rates (retirement benefits replace a high
proportion of the individual's wages), and a perverse redistribution of
benefits. The result of the high dependency ratio is that the system has
been very costly and yet offers relatively low benefits (because a large
proportion of the population gets retirement benefits, the level of bene-
fits is low). With an aging population and a pay-as-you-go system; the
tax burden becomes increasingly heavy. Several countries have
already moved to raise the retirement age and to supplement the public
retirement system with voluntary private schemes; these are clearly
steps in the right direction, but more will need to be done. Raising the
retirement age is needed on fiscal as well as on efficiency grounds,
although the short-term effect may be an upturn in the already high
unemployment rates. Lowering the average wage replacement rate to
the level of GECD countries would be desirable, especially if part of
the benefits of this restructuring could be channeled into a newly estab-
lished system of private (supplementary) savings for retirement. Shift-
ing the public system to a broader and less distorting tax base than
payroll is also desirable on efficiency and distributional grounds.
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A major challenge lies in establishing effective corporate gover-
nance, which is a fourth building block for growth. The power of man-
agers and workers (insiders) is often significant, and neither
government nor new private owners provide effective control in many
firms. The Polish government, for example, yielded significant control
rights to workers and managers'already in the 1980s and thus entered
the transition with limited powers over enterprises. In contrast, the
Czech and Slovak governments kept tight reins during the mass privati-
zation process, but the new dispersed owners or their investment fund
representatives have not exercised effective control over management
in many privatized firms. The problem is all the more serious because
the Central European economies still suffer from a shortage of mana-
gerial skills. Managers of (former) state-owned enterprises tend to
underestimate the importance of key activities such as quality improve-
ment, marketing, and accounting and audit.
In countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, a conflict of
interest has also developed between the banks and the investment
privatization funds. With some of the largest funds being owned by the
large commercial banks, a bank's desire to initiate bankruptcy of firms
may go counter to the interest of the investment fund holding shares of
these firms. It is also difficult because the legal system and its enforce-
ment is inadequate. The situation may be serious enough to account in
part for the lower volume of bankruptcies in Slovakia and the Czech
Republic relative to, for example, Hungary and Poland.
The European Union (EU) is the obvious destination for the Cen-
tral European countries and thus is an important component of their
future growth. Accession negotiations have been under way for several
years, and the economic phenomena discussed in this paper are impor-
tant for the timing of joining. Indeed, much of the economic restruc-
turing observed in these countries is influenced by EU policies, such as
the requirement that Central European firms be competitive with their
EU counterparts as a precondition to entry into the Union.
A problematic aspect of the relationship between Central and
Western Europe is the fact that the "safeguard restrictions" and anti-
dumping procedures used by EU members represent a hindrance to
exports from and growth in Central Europe. Studies indicate that the
economic impact of exports from Central Europe to the EU is very lim-
ited, albeit focused in a few areas. The challenge for the Central Euro-
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pean economies is to find freer access to ED markets, to use this access
to complete restructuring, and eventually to become ED members.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In the early and mid 1990s, the countries of Central Europe carried
out the first phase of a historically unprecedented transformation of
their centrally planned economies. Despite many remaining imperfec-
tions, these countries now have functioning market economies. They
have to overcome major structural problems and to meet the lofty
expectations of their. peoples. Above all, they face the daunting task of
generating the resources and governance structures needed to launch
high and sustained rates of economic growth that will improve their
efficiency, living standards, and chances of gaining ED membership.
In many respects, this challenge, which is more subtle than the earlier
elimination of the planning mechanism and the introduction of the·
basic building blocks of a market system, is the more difficult part of
the transition proc~ss.
NOTES
1. There is no strict definition of "Central Europe." In this article, I will focus on
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (the so-called
Visegrad countries).
2. The numbers reported in Table 1 are official estimates. With underreporting of
economic activity apparently being serious, the official figures may overestimate
the degree of economic decline. A similar problem of biased reporting exists in
Central Europe. The question is whether the problem was more intense in Russia
and Ukraine.
3. Recently, there have been indications that local unemployment has risen in a num-
ber of northern areas of China.
4. Edward Gierek's big push to import Western capital into Poland in the 1970s is an
example of a major attempt to resolve the problem. It resulted in a gross misallo-
cation of investment and contributed to Poland's high foreign indebtedness (see,
for example, Terrell 1992, 1993).
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Table 1 Growth in Real GDP in Selected Transition Economies (%)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a
Czech Republic -1.6 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 3.2 6.4 3.9 1.0
Hungary -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.4
Poland -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9
Slovakia -1.6 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5
Slovenia -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.1 3.8
Bulgaria -4.3 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9
Romania -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.6
Russia -2.0 5.0 -14.5 -8.7 12.7 4.1 3.5 0.8
Ukraine -2.6 -11.6 -13.7 -14.2 -23.0 -12.2 -10.0 -3.2
China 3.7 9.5 14.6 13.9 13.0 10.7 9.9 8.8
Vietnam 5.1 6.0 8.6 8.1 8.8 9.5 9.3 8.8
SOURCE: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 (London: EBRD, 1998); European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1997 (London: EBRD, 1997); and DataStream International (Eill).
a EBRD estimates, except China and Vietnam (which are Economist Intelligence Unit estimates).
Table 2 lnfIationa in Selected Transition Economies (%) \0..j:::..
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997° 1998c
Czech Republic 52.0 12.7 18.2 9.7 7.9 8.6 10.0 9.0
Hungary 32.2 21.6 21.1 21.2 28.3 19.8 18.4 13.5
Poland 60.4 44.3 37.6 29.4 21.6 18.5 13.2 10.0
Slovakia 58.3 9.1 25.1 11.7 7.2 5.4 6.4 9.0
Slovenia 247.1 92.9 22.8 19.5 9.0 9.0 8.8 7.0
Bulgaria . 338.9 79.4 63.8 121.9 32.9 310.8 578.5 10.0
Romania 222.8 199.2 295.5 61.7 27.8 56.9 151.4 45.0
Russia 161.0 2,506.1 840.0 204.4 128.6 21.8 10.9 150.0
Ukraine 161.0 2,730.0 10,155.0 401.0 182.0 40.0 10.0 22.0
China 3.6 6.3 14.6 24.2 17.1 8.3 2.8 -0.8d
Vietnam 82.7 37.7 8.4 9.3 16.8 5.6 3.1 n.a.e
SOURCE: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 (London: EBRD, 1998): DataStream Interna-
tional (EID); and The Economist (January 9, 1999).
a Measured as the change in year-end retail/consumer price level.
b EBRD estimates, except China and Vietnam (EID estimates).
c EBRD projections, except China (The Economist).
d Year-an-year change in price level, as of December (The Economist).
e n.a.= not available.
Table 3 Unemploymenta in Selected Transition Economies (%)
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997b 1998c
Czech Republic 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.2
Hungary 7.4 12.3 12.1 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.4 9.3
Poland 11.8 13.6 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 10.5 10.0
Slovakia n.a.d n.a. 12.2 13.7 13.1 11.1 11.6 14.0
Slovenia 8.2 11.5 14.4 14.4 13.9 13.9 14.4 15.0
Bulgaria 11.1 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 14.6
Romania 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 8.8 12.0
Russia 0.0 4.8 5.3 7.1 8.3 9.2 10.9 9.3
Ukraine 0.0 0.36 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.1 2.3 4.5
China 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 5.0 5.0
SOURCE: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 (London: EBRD, 1998): and DataStream Inter-
national (Eill, IPS).
a Measured as end-of-year unemployment rate.
b EBRD estimates, except China (Eill estimate).
c WDI estimates.
d n.a. = not available.
Table 4 General Government Balancesa in Selected Transition Economies (% of GDP) \00\
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997b 1998C
Czech Republic n.a.d -1.9 -3.1 0.5 -1.2 -1.8 -1.2 -2.1 -2.4
Hungary 0.4 -2.9 -6.8 -5.5 -8.4 -6.7 -3.1 -4.9 -4.9
Poland 3.1 -6.7 -6.7 -3.1 -3.1 -2.8 -3.3 -3.1 -3.1
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. -7.0 -1.3 0.2 -1.9 -3.8 -4.0
Slovenia -0.3 2.6 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -1.1 -1.0
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. -5.2 -10.9 -5.8 -5.6 -10.4 -2.1 -2.0
Romania 1.0 3.3 -4.6 -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 -4.0 -3.6 -5.5
Russia n.a. n.a. -4.1 -7.4 -9.0 -5.7 -8.3 -7.4 -8.0
Ukraine n.a. n.a. -25.4 -16.2 -9.1 -7.1 -3.2 -5.6 -3.0
China n.a. -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 n.a.
Vietnam -5.8 -1.5 -2.4 -4.8 -1.7 -1.3 -0.6 -1.8 n.a.
SOURCE: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 (London: EBRD, 1998); European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1997 (London: EBRD, 1997); and DataStream International (EID).
a "General government" includes the state, municipality, and extrabudgetary funds.
b EBRD estimates, except China and Vietnam (EID estimates).
C EBRD projections.
d n.a. = not available.
I
~
Table 5 Foreign Direct Investmenta (US$, millions)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997b . 1998C
Czech Republic n.a.d n.a. 1,000.0 600.0 700.0 2,500.0 1,400.0 1,300.0 1,000.0
Hungary 300.0 1,500.0 1,500.0 2,300.0 1,100.0 4,500.0 2,000.0 2,100.0 1,500.0
Poland 0.0 100.0 300.0 600.0 500.0 1,100.0 2,800.0 3,000.0 4,000.0
Slovakia n.a. 80.0 100.0 110.0 240.0 190.0 200.0 50.0 220.0
Slovenia 0.0 41.0 113.0 111.0 128.0 176.0 186.0 321.0 200.0
Bulgaria n.a. 56.0 42.0 40.0 105.0 82.0 100.0 497.0 300.0
Romania 18.0 37.0 73.0 97.0 341.0 417.0 263.0 1,224.0 900.0
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 500.0 1,700.0 1,700.0 3,800.0 1,500.0
Ukraine n.a. n.a. 200.0 200.0 100.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0
China n.a. 4,370.0 11,160.0 27,520.0 33,790.0 35,850.0 40,180.0 n.a. n.a.
Vietnam 16.0 229.0 385.0 523.0 742.0 1,400.0 500.0 n.a. n.a.
SOURCE: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 (London: EBRD, 1998); European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1997 (London: EBRD, 1997); and World Bank's 1998 World Development Indica-
tors CD-ROM.
a Net inflows recorded in the balance of payments.
b EBRD estimates.
C EBRD projections.




Table 6 Investor Ratings of Countriesa
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Country 15 Nov. 15 Nov. 15 Nov. 12 Nov. 14 Nov. 12 Nov.
Czech Republic BBB BBB A A A A-
Hungary BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB-
Poland n.a.b n.a. n.a. BBB- BBB- BBB-
Slovakia n.a. BB- BB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a. A A A-
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. BB- BB- BB+
Latvia n.a. n.a. n,a. n.a. BBB A-
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. BBB- BBB-
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. BB- BB- CCC
China BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+
SOURCE: Standard & Poor's Rating Handbook and Standard & Poor's Global Rating
Handbook, various years.
a Long-term ratings of sovereign debt in foreign currencies.
b n.a. = not available.
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